ETA in Spain: Explaining Basque Violence by Kern, Jenny
  
 
 
ETA IN SPAIN: EXPLAINING BASQUE VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 
 2017 
By Jenny Kern  
 
 
 
 
A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion  
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies  
Croft Institute for International Studies  
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College 
The University of Mississippi  
 
 
 
University, Mississippi  
May 2017  
 
 
 
 
Approved:   
 
 
    
                 
 Advisor: Dr. Miguel Centellas 
 
 
 
              
Reader: Dr. Oliver Dinius  
 
 
 
        
Reader: Dr. Cristina Delano  
 
Kern 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
My thesis focuses on Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA), a terrorist group in País Vasco, Spain 
and attempts to determine the causes behind ETA’s violence.  I focus on three areas of study: the 
political situation of País Vasco, the public opinion, and the economic situation of País Vasco.  
Data is collected from the Basque government, the EuskoBarómetro, and World Bank, and 
showed in correlation with ETA attacks to discern patterns.  Due to limited data, my area of 
study focuses mainly on ETA’s later years, when they were less active.  This allows me to focus 
on the periods of the ceasefires in contrast to active years, to determine if one factor played more 
of a role in violence than the others.   
While the Basque case is unique in Spain, it has similarities to other cases of ethnic 
violence.  As such, if the cause of Basque violence and their motivations towards reaching a 
ceasefire can be discovered, they may be implemented in other cases of ethnic violence, such as 
that of the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.   
Through my research, I concluded that neither nationalist representation in the Basque 
Parliament or public opinion correlates with ETA attacks; however, increased economic 
prosperity led to decreased violence.  While I found that political representation and public 
opinion were not consequential, it is possible that they played a small role which I was not able 
to discern through my research.  As such, my research is inconclusive and I suggestive further 
study into looking into the causes of Basque violence and its demise.  One such area for further 
study that I suggest is the internal structure of the group and how increased action from the state, 
including imprisoning leaders, may have led to the downfall of the group.  
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Introduction 
 
My thesis focuses on Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA), a nationalist terrorist group in País 
Vasco, Spain active from 1959 to 2011. While I originally sought to explain how ETA was able 
to reach a ceasefire, this turned out to not be feasible, due to lack of available information.  
Instead, my topic evolved to explore possible causes for ETA’s violence.  To this extent, I 
focused on three main areas: the political situation, the role of public opinion, and economic 
conditions. To a lesser extent, I will also examine the relationship between these three factors. 
Learning the cause of Basque violence is important, as it could be used to predict the emergence 
of ethnic violence in other areas, as well as help to explain how ethnic violence initially emerges 
as a course of action.   
The Basque case is significant as it is unique in its approach to nationalism. While 
Catalonia is another region similar to País Vasco in its desire for independence from Spain, how 
they have gone about achieving their goals is completely different. Both regions possess a 
distinct language, Catalan in Catalonia and Euskera in País Vasco, and specific cultural 
traditions. Catalonia emphasized its language and cultural ties in order to bring its people 
together. However, Euskera and Basque cultural traditions were not as prevalent as those of 
Catalonia, forcing Basques to find a different avenue towards unification. The Basques’ radical 
form of nationalism relied on mobilization and violence. As a result, the Basque case is singular 
within Spain in its attempt to use of violence to inspire nationalist sentiment.  
As the Basque case is unique within Spain, its lessons may not be universal.  Although 
the Basque case is one of ethnic nationalism tied to violence, it is not linked to economic 
oppression, as the Basque region is wealthy and does not face economic pressures.  This stands 
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in contrast to issues of violent ethnic nationalism in which violence is related to economic 
hardship.  Since País Vasco, and ETA by extension, do not face this pressure, the reasons behind 
ETA’s ceasefire are not likely to be able to be applied to cases in which economic oppression is 
present.   
I analyze various sets of data, including election results, public opinion polls, and 
economic data, to try to determine other factors that were key in leading to a ceasefire. I use the 
incidence of violence, measured by deaths, injuries, and attacks, as a baseline from which to 
measure the other factors. Using public opinion data, I assess the opinion towards ETA, Basque 
independence, and the Spanish state. I then compare this with the voting data to examine the 
percentage of vote that each party received, and whether they have ties to ETA or the Spanish 
state. In regards to economic data, I examine the GDP per capita and compare it throughout the 
different regions of Spain. Ideally, I will explore data from the onset of ETA in 1939 to 2011, 
when the ceasefire was enacted. I will collect data from a wide variety of sources, including 
EuskoBarómetro and the World Bank. 
The first chapter will provide an overview of the history of the Basque country, the rise 
of ETA, and the process of negotiating a ceasefire. This brief history of the situation is essential 
to understanding why ETA formed as well as why the Basque case is unique in using violence as 
a form of resistance. Additionally, it will provide a brief examination of ceasefire negotiations 
that failed, as well as the one that ultimately proved successful.  
Nationalism portrayed through politics will be examined in the second chapter. A brief 
overview of the important nationalist and non-nationalist Basque political parties will be 
provided before examining the composition of the Basque Parliament from its beginning in 1980 
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to current times. Parties will be examined divided between nationalist and non-nationalist, with 
their representation compared to ETA activity to see if there is a correlation.  
Public opinion of the Basques will be covered in the third chapter. In regards to 
identification and nationalist sentiment, preoccupation with violence, opinion on ETA, and views 
on ceasefire negotiations, this chapter will seek to discover links between various variables and 
the activity of ETA. However, as the EuskoBarómetro was not conducted until 1999, there is no 
data prior to this.  As such, the conclusions will be relatively limited and focused more on the 
periods of peace. Due to this major limitation, a clear sense of public opinion regarding ETA, 
especially during their most active years, is not possible to obtain.  This will severely limit this 
section, making the conclusions unable to be widely applicable.   
The fourth chapter will cover the economy of País Vasco. By using the GDP per capita 
(PPP), the economic status of Euskadi will be compared to that of Spain. Additionally, the 
opinions of Basques regarding the economic climate will be taken into account and compared 
with the economic realities. ETA violence will be compared to the GDP per capita to see if 
attacks had any effect on the economic prosperity of the region.   
Through my research, I have concluded there is not a correlation between ETA violence 
and nationalist political representation, Basque identity, desires for independence, or nationalist 
sentiment; however, the Basques preoccupation with violence and economic prosperity showed a 
correlation with ETA attacks. 
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Ch. 1: The Basque Country and ETA 
 
País Vasco, the community divided between Spain and France, has a long, unique 
history. It is said that “the Basques are one of the unique people-islands to be found on the face 
of the earth, completely different in every sense from the peoples around them, and their 
language… forms an island somehow comparable to those peaks which still surface above the 
water in a flood zone” (Kurlansky 1999, 1). As the Basque people possess their own language 
and culture, they are very proud of their heritage and singularity among the Spanish population. 
The history of the Basques helped lead to the formation of Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA), a 
terrorist organization formed to fight for Basque rights and independence.  
From its formation in 1959, ETA has been responsible for approximately 832 deaths 
(Sánchez-Cuenca 2007, 292). Through violence, the Basques were able to advocate for Basque 
freedom from Spain. In order to accomplish this, ETA targeted political leaders and public 
figures in order to advance their cause. ETA reached their peak in the 1980’s during Spain’s 
transition to democracy, before beginning their decline in power and effectiveness.  
Numerous attempts were made at negotiating a ceasefire with ETA; however, the 
majority only lasted a few months. In 2006, a ceasefire was seen as plausible, but crumbled when 
ETA attacked Madrid’s airport. Finally, in 2011, ETA called a ceasefire that was verifiable by 
international observers. This ceasefire has held to this day, effectively ending ETA’s terrorist 
activities.  
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Historical Background and Uniqueness of the Basque Region 
País Vasco and the Basque people have a history that is unique from the rest of Spain. 
From living in harmony with the Romans, to fighting off the Moors and Visigoths, the Basques 
have fought against outsiders and their influence to preserve their way of life. Even after they 
were incorporated into the Spanish monarchy, the Basques were able to preserve a degree of 
autonomy through their fueros, ancient laws that protected the right to self-rule by the traditional 
Basque laws (Collins, 1986, 256). However, this ability to self-rule was destroyed in the Civil 
War, when General Francisco Franco prevailed over the Republican forces. As a result, Basque 
culture was repressed, leading to backlash.  
País Vasco is divided into seven provinces, four in Spain and three in France, and has 
been the home of the Basques for centuries, although the exact origins of the Basques are 
unknown. The singular defining trait of the Basques is their language: Euskera. Although the 
first texts written in Euskera only appear in the Middle Ages, references to the language predate 
the written form by at least a millennium (Collins 1986, 9). Euskera is the only surviving 
language in Europe that is not Indo-European, suggesting that Euskera may be the oldest 
European language (Collins 1986, 11-12). This provides evidence that Basques are among the 
oldest European cultures. Basques lived in a relatively remote part of the Iberian Peninsula, so 
were able to peacefully coexist with the Roman Empire, as evidenced by the lack of military 
conflict in the Basque region “up to the final collapse of centralized Roman government in the 
area in the early fifth century AD” (Collins 1986, 47). After the Roman Empire fell and the 
Visigoths invaded Spain, the Basques were forced to fight to preserve their way of life (Collins 
1986, 69).  
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During the Middle Ages, the Visigoths and Franks fought for control of the regions. The 
Basque people resisted militarily and culturally, maintaining their own language and religion. 
Situated between the Visigoth and Frankish kingdoms, the Basques were a contested area 
claimed by both kingdoms (Collins 1986, 99), which forced the Basques to fight invaders from 
all sides in order to preserve their way of life. After the fall of the Visigoth rule due to the Arab 
expeditions, the Basques remained free from outside control. Although the Arab armies passed 
through the Pyrenees without resistance, the Basque region clashed with them when they 
invaded; the Basques successfully defended their land from invasion (Collins 1986, 117-119).  
When the Basque region was incorporated into the Spanish kingdom of Castile, the 
Basques retained their fueros, ancient laws that protected the right to self-rule by the traditional 
Basque laws (Collins 1986, 259). The Basque fueros originated in the fourteenth century, when 
Don Juan, the Castilian King who united the provinces, swore that he and his successors would 
“maintain the ‘fueros, customs, franchises, and liberties’ of the land” (Strong 1893, 325-326). 
Fueros encompassed a variety of rules, both written and unwritten, but the major points included 
exemption from taxation by the state, import duties, and military services outside their province 
(Kurlansky 1999, 66). Each king or queen of Castile swore allegiance to upholding the Basque 
fueros, including Queen Isabel, who, along with King Ferdinand, united the Iberian provinces 
into modern day Spain (Strong 1893, 326).  
Due to the fueros, the Basque claim for self-determination was stronger than that of other 
regions. Basque autonomy statues were proposed in various instances throughout history, but 
were not granted until 1936. Formed in alliance with the Second Republic forces against General 
Francisco Franco, the Basque government only lasted during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939); 
upon the Republic’s defeat, Franco abolished the Basque statute of autonomy.  
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Franco’s repression of all expressions of Basque pride created the environment from 
which ETA was born. During Franco’s regime, which began in 1939, Basque nationalism was 
fiercely repressed. With the goal of unifying Spain into one nation, Franco declared Castellano, 
Castilian Spanish, the official language and banned all minority languages, including Euskara, 
the Basque language. Additionally, nationalist symbols, such as the flag of Euskal Herria (the 
Basque World), and other elements of Basque culture were prohibited. Leaders of the Basque 
nationalist party (PNV) were either imprisoned or forced into exile; many fled into the Basque 
region of France. On July 31, 1959, the feast day of St. Ignacius Loyola, patron saint of País 
Vasco, Basque students formed Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA) in Bilbao. Meaning Basque 
Homeland and Freedom, ETA struggled to define its ideology for roughly a decade, but members 
shared the common goal of creating an independent Basque state.  
 
The Rise of ETA 
Due to the repressive policies that General Franco imposed on the Spanish section of the 
Basque country, ETA formed in the Spanish section, as the French portion did not face heavy 
repression. However, the Basque case is singular, as it is the only region that responded to 
repression with violence. By attacking mainly political figures, ETA showed that their grievance 
was with the Spanish state, both under General Franco and throughout the transition to 
democracy.  
While other regions of Spain, such as Catalonia, were culturally repressed, the Basques 
were the only region that used violence as a form of resistance, making it a unique case. Due to 
the strong cultural and linguistic ties of the Catalans, they were able to avoid violence in their 
efforts for nationalism. However, in Euskal Herria, relatively few people spoke Euskera due to 
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the repression of language by Franco, the difficulty of the language, and various other factors. As 
a result, the Basque populace did not share strong cultural and linguistic ties, like the Catalans. 
The lack of cultural cohesion between the Basques made the use of continued violence by ETA 
necessary. Through violence, the people were able to band together to form a cohesive front. In 
describing the use of violence, Carr and Fusi stated, “It was [the Catalans’] cultural self-
confidence that made terrorism superfluous, a terrorism that perhaps suited the more racist 
nationalism of the Basques and their emphasis on physical prowess and exuberant youth” 
(Conversi 1997, 2). Due to the lack of widespread culture throughout Euskal Herria, the Basques 
created an antagonistic identity, or an identity formed through the exclusion of those dissimilar, 
by focusing on borders instead of culture (Conversi 1997, 5). By pitting Euskal Herria against 
Spain, ETA was able to gain traction and support for its use of violence in order to form a 
Basque nation.  
ETA began an armed struggle against those it viewed as the repressive symbols of the 
state in 1968. When the police killed a respected ETA leader, ETA retaliated by killing the police 
chief of San Sebastian. This, in turn, provoked a swift response from the government—the 
imprisonment, torture, and exile of thousands of Basques. However, ETA was not deterred and 
continued its fight by kidnapping and ransoming foreign officials, industrialists, and other 
prominent people.  
While these acts increased ETA’s presence, ETA is most well-known for the 
assassination of Spain’s Prime Minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was Franco’s right 
hand man and chosen successor. By assassinating Franco’s successor, ETA inadvertently played 
a role in Spain’s transition from a dictatorship to a democracy, creating space for Juan Carlos de 
Borbon, the grandson of King Alfonso XIII, to come to power. Juan Carlos supported reforms, 
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such as the Constitution of 1978, that helped Spain transition to a constitutional monarchy. As 
Spain transitioned to democracy, ETA lost the sympathy of the international community. ETA 
“was no longer seen as a group of freedom fighters opposing a detested fascist regime, but a 
bona fide terrorist group attacking a fledgling democratic state” (Corrado 1997, 573). Hoping to 
regain public favor, ETA assassinated members of the Civil Guard and the military police, as 
well as their families. Although they expected a retaliation, one never came. Instead, the situation 
for the Basques gradually improved.  
 As democracy took hold in Spain, and the relationship between País Vasco and the 
central state improved, ETA began to split into political and violent factions. Spain released 
political prisoners, allowed many exiles—including ETA members—to return, and supported a 
more open relationship with País Vasco. This led to the Statute of Guernica, whereby the 
Spanish government gave the Basque regional parliament increased powers. Due to the 
agreement, ETA-PM, the political branch of ETA, negotiated an amnesty agreement with the 
government and, in return, renounced violence to pursue their goals politically; however, ETA-
M, the branch of ETA that favored violent action, remained active.  
 Although ETA-M1 continued its campaign, they had softened their demands. ETA 
demanded, “general amnesty for all Basque prisoners; substitution of Basque police for Spanish 
police in Basque regions; Basque government control of the Spanish army in the Basque country; 
and the right to self-determination of the Basque people” (Corrado 1997, 575). The Spanish 
government did not meet these demands, and the terrorist attacks continued, with ETA 
assassinating officials and bombing public places.  
                                                      
1 From this point forward, ETA-M will simply be referred to as ETA. ETA-PM negotiated a separate peace 
with the government and renounced violence, leaving ETA-M the only operating branch.  
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In the mid 1980s, the French and Spanish governments collaborated on an operation 
against ETA. The joint effort led to the arrest and imprisonment of 500 members, including the 
majority of the leaders. Following these massive arrests, ETA attacks became less frequent. 
During this time, ETA attacked Prime Minister José María Aznar, the leader of the Partido 
Popular (PP), a conservative party, that promoted the idea of a single, centralized Spain. In this 
1995 attack, ETA bombed Aznar’s car, destroying two nearby buildings, 15 cars, and injuring 16 
people (Nash 1995). Aznar emerged from the attack with only minor head injuries, but, through 
this attack, ETA showed that politicians continued to be targets for terrorism.  
All of Spain’s main political parties, with the exception of ETA’s political wing, spoke 
out against the attack, calling it an “threat to the country’s young democracy” and stating that, 
had the attack succeeded, “we would have gone back to 1936,” the start of the Civil War (Nash 
1995). ETA continued violent attacks, despite public opposition; however, political parties began 
to work towards peace.  
 
Efforts to Negotiate a Ceasefire 
 Numerous attempts were made at negotiating a ceasefire with ETA; however, ETA 
proved to be untrustworthy in holding the ceasefires. After countless ceasefires that lasted only a 
few months, the ceasefire of 2006 seemed promising, until ETA attacked Madrid’s airport due to 
postponed and unsuccessful negotiations. As the 2006 ceasefire did not hold, the Spanish 
government closed off all further attempts at negotiations with ETA. However, ETA leaders 
worked with international actors to call a ceasefire that was verifiable by an international 
committee. Called in 2011, this ceasefire has held until the present day.  
Kern 14 
The first attempts to reach a ceasefire with ETA were unsuccessful, with truces lasting 
only a month or two, as ETA was unwilling to compromise on core demands. In the wake of the 
9/11 attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Aznar and the Spanish government cracked 
down on terrorism, increasing cooperation with France and the European Union. Police action 
against ETA strengthened and in 2002 Parliament outlawed Batasuna, the political wing of ETA. 
While the Spanish government was cracking down on ETA, other Basque political parties were 
searching for a route towards peace. Arnaldo Otegi, the spokesman of Batasuna, and Jesús 
Eguiguren, the president of the Basque Socialist Party, met in secret to discuss the failures of 
previous ceasefires and how to move forward politically.  
As the Basques were willing to progress towards peace, Elkarri, a social group focused 
on the peaceful solution to the Basque conflict, invited international experts from the US and 
members of Sinn Fein who participated in the Northern Ireland peace process, to visit the Basque 
country and assist in the peace process (MacDonald and Bernardo 2006, 189). Seeing progress, 
in late 2003, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), based in Geneva, Switzerland, 
offered its assistance. Nevertheless, Aznar and the Spanish state refused to begin talks with ETA 
and declared them responsible for the 11-M train bombings in Madrid in 2004, despite 
overwhelming evidence that the attacks were carried out by Islamic terrorists. Distrust of the 
government followed and Aznar and the PP were voted out of power. As the 11-M attack 
prompted a strong reaction against terrorist violence, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) were voted into power, as they were willing to 
negotiate with ETA to end violence (Esser and Bridges 2011, 64). 
 Zapatero’s government advocated for dialogue with ETA, receiving approval from 
parliament in May 2005. The peace process was created around the proposals that Otegi, the 
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spokesperson of Batasuna, and Eguiguren, the president of the Basque Socialist Party, agreed on 
in their secret talks and presented to the Spanish state when the talks began in May 2005. Held in 
Geneva and Oslo with the assistance of the HD Centre, discussions allowed ETA to negotiate 
with the Spanish state about technical issues, including the return of prisoners and disarmament, 
while Batasuna and Basque political parties would negotiate on political issues (Esser and 
Bridges 2011, 65). Basque political parties, including the Basque Socialist Party (PSE), 
Batasuna, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) met confidentially to further discuss the 
politics of an agreement and agreed on proposals that granted Basques the “‘right to decide’ their 
future” (Esser and Bridges 2011, 65). In light of future talks with the Spanish state, ETA 
announced a permanent ceasefire in March 2006.  
 While the 2006 negotiations presented an opportunity to end violence, the peace 
ultimately failed. During the peace process, there was distrust on both sides. While ETA began 
by offering a ceasefire, the Spanish state used this period to continue to pursue and prosecute 
ETA operatives instead of opening negotiations; additionally, weapon caches were discovered 
and seized (Esser and Bridges 2011, 69). By not reciprocating ETA’s goodwill gesture, the 
Spanish state put peace negotiations on an unsteady base. This led to an increase in violence, 
including kale borroka, street violence, and the attack on Madrid’s Barajas airport in December 
of 2006, which killed two. In the wake of the attack, the government declared that peace 
negotiations were finished. Nevertheless, ETA maintained that the ceasefire was still in effect 
until June 2007, when they officially ended it.  
 Although the Spanish government declared that no further negotiations with ETA would 
occur, some ETA leaders still hoped for peace. They realized that continued violence was 
contrary to public opinion. As the government was unwilling to negotiate, Otegi and later Rufi 
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Etxeberria, another prominent leader of Batasuna, worked with international actors who 
participated in the 2007 peace talks to reopen peace negotiations. Internally, Otegi and 
Etxeberria worked to obtain an alliance between the nonviolent, pro-independence Basque 
groups, while internationally the Brussels Declaration called on ETA to declare a “permanent 
and internationally verifiable cease-fire” (Woodworth 2010). In response, ETA halted its 
offensive armed actions in September 2010, and declared a permanent ceasefire in January 2011.  
The following month, Batasuna presented statutes for a new political party, Sortu, that 
rejected violence of any kind, and, although the government was opposed to any party that held 
ETA’s goals, the Basque Country began to press Spain for recognition of the changes made. In 
May, the nationalist Left, made up of parties in favor of Basque nationalism and separatism, was 
allowed to return to politics and Bildu, a coalition of legal nationalist left political parties, won 
25% of the Basque vote, a much higher percentage than before; Bildu’s success signified the 
resurgence of nationalism in politics (Whitfield 2015, 9). By July 2011, Batasuna concluded that 
no more could be achieved without the government’s involvement, as ETA demanded 
government guarantees to end violence, including the legalization of Sortu and measures to 
benefit its prisoners (Whitfield 2015, 9). 
 While direct talks between ETA and the government did not take place, a form of virtual 
peacemaking, between ETA, the nationalist Left, and the government, via international 
facilitators, occurred. Through these talks, an International Verification Commission (IVC), 
limited to verifying ETA’s ceasefire, was created. Finally, in October 2011, an international 
conference was held in San Sebastián, where international leaders issued a declaration for ETA 
to end all violence. Three days after the conference, ETA declared the “definitive end to its 
armed activity,” which Spanish and French security forces soon confirmed (Currin 2012, 30). 
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While ETA hoped to move forward from this point, the election of Mariano Rajoy and 
the PP in November 2011-- due to factors unrelated to relations with ETA-- prevented further 
progress. In June 2012, Sortu was legalized, but this was the only concession made. International 
contact with ETA was halted; ETA did not retaliate. Despite the Spanish government’s lack of 
involvement, ETA continued to uphold its side of the deal by decommissioning or destroying 
caches of weapons. The IVC reported in February 2014 that ETA had destroyed arms, 
explosives, and ammunition, while ETA confirmed that it would continue to destroy its arms “‘to 
the end, to the last arsenal’” (Whitfield 2015, 10). Although the peace process between ETA and 
the Spanish government would have been accomplished more quickly and more successfully had 
the ruling party not changed halfway through negotiations, Batasuna and the nationalist Left 
carried out the decommissioning of ETA with the assistance of international actors to verify the 
authenticity of disarmament. Despite skepticism among Spaniards and the Spanish government’s 
refusal to acknowledge the ceasefire, the 2010 ceasefire that was internationally brokered has 
lasted until today, successfully ending the activities of a nationalist terrorist group. Furthermore, 
the last at large ETA leader, Mikel Irastorza, was arrested as of November 2016, effectively 
imprisoning all of ETA leadership.    
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Ch. 2: Political Situation 
 
The political situation in Spain inspired the formation of ETA during the dictatorship of 
General Franco. Due to regional repression, ETA fought against Franco, reaching a high point in 
public opinion with the assassination of Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, removing 
Franco’s chosen successor from the picture. This led Franco to choose Juan Carlos as his 
successor, and Juan Carlos was responsible for the transition of Spain to democracy. As a result, 
the group helped to influence the future of the Spanish government. Thus, ETA’s formation 
resulted from the political situation in Spain, and helped to influence the course of politics.  
This section discusses the various political parties, both Basque nationalist and those 
aligned with the ruling national parties, including their formation and current standing in the 
Basque region as well as within Spain. Following the discussion of Basque political parties, I 
will examine election results from País Vasco, including the Basque Parliament elections from 
1980 until the present. In examining the election results, I will focus on the representation of 
nationalist parties in key periods of time throughout the history of ETA.  
 
Basque Nationalist Political Parties 
While ETA was indirectly involved in the political sphere through attacks on political 
figures, Basque political parties defended nationalist ideas within the political system. A variety 
of nationalist parties, both with and without ties to ETA, were present in Basque politics. This 
section provides a brief description of the nationalist parties discussed throughout this chapter. 
This includes the only pre- Civil War Basque nationalist party, the centrist Basque Nationalist 
Party (PNV) and its splinter party Eusko Alkartasuna (EA); left wing opponents of ETA, 
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Euskadiko Eskerra (EE) and Aralar; the political wing of ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB), and its 
offshoot Euskal Herritarrok (EH); and, finally, Bildu, a far-left coalition. Understanding the 
background of the various nationalist political parties is important in understanding how they 
view issues, including violence.  Despite all being nationalist parties, each takes a different 
position on topics, notably violence and ETA.   
Formed in 1895, the Partido Nacionalisto Vasco (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), was 
created with the purpose of restoring fueros to País Vasco. As a centrist party, PNV attracted 
approximately one-third of the vote within País Vasco from the 1910s to the 1930s, electing 
several members to the Cortes in Madrid. Through joining forces with the Second Republic, 
PNV was successful in restoring political autonomy to the region in 1936. However, when the 
Second Republic lost the Spanish Civil War to General Franco, the statute of autonomy was 
revoked and Basque nationalism was repressed. This forced PNV to operate clandestinely within 
Spain or through exile in the Basque region of France. Once General Franco’s dictatorship 
concluded and democracy was restored, PNV returned to activity in Spain; however, as a 
regional party, the PNV only operated within País Vasco. Despite its limited reach, PNV became 
the largest regional party within País Vasco (Pedahzur 2003, 82). While the PNV supports 
Basque nationalism, it condemns using violence to achieve goals, making the party an opponent 
of ETA’s violent actions. Nevertheless, the party has dominated Basque politics from the 
granting of the regions autonomy statute until 2009, when the Basque Socialist Party (PSE) 
gained control. However, PNV returned to power in 2012, the year after ETA’s ceasefire, and 
remains in power today.  
While the PNV is the traditional Basque nationalist party, the majority of Basque, and 
Catalan, nationalist parties are leftist. As nationalist parties are usually rightist, this represents a 
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notable difference to the Basque and Catalan cases. Basque nationalist parties, the majority of 
which emerged during or immediately following Franco’s rule, are grouped under the category 
of “abertzale left.” However, within the abertzale left, there is a schism on the issue of violence, 
with some supporting ETA and others not. While Euskadiko Eskerra (EE) and Aralar are against 
ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), and EH Bildu are pro ETA.  
Euskadiko Eskerra (EE), a left wing nationalist party opposed to ETA, was founded in 
1977 as part of a coalition of Basque and Marxist parties. Many EE members eventually 
separated from the party to join Herri Batasuna (HB), after it adopted its non-violent stance. EE 
later formed coalitions with Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), a splinter party of the PNV. In 1991, part 
of EE merged with the Socialist Party of the Basque Country (PSE), to form PSE-EE, while the 
other segment joined with EA. This splinter effectively ended the party’s original ideology of left 
wing nationalism, as the group changed its ideology to one of social democracy.  
Founded in 2000, Aralar is another leftist party that supports Basque independence, 
although it is opposed to the violence of ETA. The party is a splinter group of HB that broke 
away when ETA broke the 2000 truce. Unlike many Basque separatist parties, Aralar has a 
presence in both País Vasco and Navarre. While Aralar has run independently, it has also joined 
in a coalition with Zutik, a party originally part of the EH coalition.  
Herri Batasuna (HB), which became ETA’s political wing, was formed in 1978 as a 
coalition of left, nationalistic parties who worked to further Basque independence. Originally 
brought together to advocate for “no” in the referendum held on the Spanish Constitution, the 
party did not achieve its goal, but continued to work for Basque independence. To further its 
fight, when the party won seats in the Cortes in Madrid, it would not take its seats, as a pledge to 
uphold the Spanish Constitution had to be made. As the government was concerned about ties 
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between HB and ETA, in 1998 HB helped to form Euskal Herritarrok (EH), a leftist coalition 
which HB became a part of. EH, Basque for “We, the Basque citizens,” absorbed HB, as well as 
including other leftist Basque parties including Zutik and Batzarre. However, Zutik and Batzarre 
left the coalition in 2000, after the end of the ETA truce of 1999. This meant that EH was 
essentially HB by a different name. For this reason, in 2001, the group changed its name once 
again to Batasuna. However, in 2003, HB, EH, and Batasuna were banned, as it was considered 
part of “the ‘terrorist network’ of the armed separatist group ETA;” HB was the first political 
party banned since the reign of General Franco (“Batasuna Banned Permanently” 2003). That 
same year, Batasuna, EH, and HB made it onto the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, as they 
have “supported ETA’s acts of terrorism” while the “leadership and membership have included a 
number of people convicted of ETA-related terrorist acts” (Boucher 2003).  
Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), meaning Basque Solidarity, was created in 1986 when it split 
from PNV-EAJ. EA operates in both the Spanish and French Basque country working toward 
achieving the creation of an independent Basque state. Additionally, EA and the PNV formed a 
coalition in Navarre to maximize Basque nationalist interests.  
Bildu, later changed to EH Bildu, was created in 2011 and is a coalition of Aralar, EA, 
Alternatiba, and Sortu. Viewed as a far-left party, the pro-independence party is active in País 
Vasco and Navarre. As a coalition, EH Bildu combined members of the center left, the far left, 
and independent members of the left wing, including many former supporters or members of 
Batasuna. While originally banned due to ties with Batasuna, the Constitutional Court of Spain 
lifted the ban in time for the 2011 campaigns, allowing Bildu to participate (Bourne 2010, 5-6). 
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Non-Nationalist Parties 
 While Basque politics is dominated by nationalist parties, specifically PNV, non-
nationalist parties have a presence in the region. The most important of these parties, the Popular 
Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), are discussed in this section. These 
non-nationalist parties are popular throughout Spain and have been the governing parties in 
Spain during negotiations with ETA.  
Classified as a conservative, Christian democratic party the Partido Popular (PP, Popular 
Party), is one of the main political parties in Spain. Although PP was not founded until 1989, it 
was a splinter group of the 1976 People’s Alliance, which joined the Democratic Coalition and, 
later, the People’s Coalition (CP). As the party was closely aligned to Franco’s ideology and 
regime, the group started to lose popularity, and they reformed as the Popular Party (PP) and 
rebranded as a typical conservative party. As the party continued to rebrand and paint itself as a 
centrist-right party against terrorism and exorbitant public spending and taxation, José María 
Aznar, a former Premier of Castile and León, became the chairman of the party. By 1996, PP 
was the largest party in Spain, and Aznar became Prime Minister, with the support of the Basque 
Nationalist Party. As PP transformed to a more centrist party that advocated harsher punishment 
for terrorism, the anti-violent PNV came to support PP. It was under Aznar’s government that 
the first truce with ETA was met in 1998 when Aznar agreed to move ETA prisoners to prisons 
closer to the Basque region, easing the burden on Basque families who wished to visit relatives. 
Although the truce did not last much longer than a year, it was the first attempt at negotiating 
with the group. While PP remained in power in Spain until 2004, their loss was partially due to 
PP candidate Mariana Rajoy blaming ETA for the 11-M train attacks in Madrid prior to the 
elections, despite evidence that Al-Qaeda perpetrated the attacks. The PP did not return to power 
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until 2011, when Rajoy beat the Spanish Workers Party (PSOE) candidate. Rajoy and the 
People’s Party are currently in power in Spain.  
Founded in 1879, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Workers 
Party), was formed as a typical European social democracy party. After being banned in 1939 by 
Franco, PSOE was re-legalized in 1977 after facing heavy persecution at the hands of Franco. 
PSOE abandoned its Marxist roots in 1979, similar to most European social democratic parties, 
and now is defined as center left, social democratic, and progressive. PSOE gained power in the 
1982 general election and Felipe González remained Prime Minister until 1996, when PP took 
power due to a decrease in public support. This decrease was partially due to state terrorism 
against ETA. The PSOE government illegally formed Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación 
(GAL), or Antiterrorist Liberation Groups, to fight against ETA; however, PSOE officials never 
acknowledged responsibility for GAL or condemned the crimes they committed. The GAL issue 
plagued PSOE during the election, leading to PP winning control. PSOE and Prime Minister José 
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero regained power in 2004, after the 11-M attacks. The Zapatero 
government favored negotiations with ETA, which led to the 2006 ceasefire, ending with an 
ETA attack on Madrid’s Barajas Airport. Despite the ceasefire failure, Zapatero remained in 
power until 2011, when PP defeated PSOE.  
  
 
Basque Parliament Elections  
Established by the Statute of Basque Autonomy of 1979, the Basque Parliament, the 
legislative body of País Vasco, first met in 1980 and is composed of 75 members elected by the 
citizens of País Vasco. Each of the three provinces of País Vasco has 25 deputies, despite 
differences in the populations of each province. Elected deputies then vote to elect the 
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lehendakari, or president. According to the Basque Statute of Autonomy, Euskera, like 
Castellano, is recognized as an official language in Euskadi (“The Statute of Autonomy of the 
Basque Country”). As such, Euskera is a language for governmental, academic, and cultural 
documents, proceedings, or correspondence. Due to this, sessions of the Basque Parliament are 
conducted in both Spanish and Euskera.  
Within this section, I will examine the composition of the Basque Parliament, with 
special attention paid to the nationalist parties and how their presence has changed over time. I 
will focus specifically on key points in ETA’s history, including the 1980s when the group was 
most active, 2000 and 2006 when the group broke ceasefires, and 2011 when a permanent 
ceasefire was reached.  
 
Graph 2.1: Nationalist Representation in Basque Parliament (Total and by Party)  
 
 
Since the creation of the Basque Parliament, Basque nationalist parties have received a 
majority of the vote, with notable exceptions in 2005 and 2009, where they received 41% and 
48% of the vote, respectively. It is interesting to note that within the 1980s, when ETA was the 
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most active, nationalist party representation was at its highest, gaining 64% of the vote in 1980 
and 1984, 68% in 1986, and 66% in 1990 (Departamento de Seguridad). Additionally, within this 
period, PNV, the moderate nationalist party that condemns violence, received the highest 
proportion of the vote. However, Herri Batasuna, the political extension of ETA, received the 
second highest number of votes.   
Nationalist representation in the Basque Parliament reached a peak in 1986, with 67.9% 
of seats belonging to nationalist parties. However, in 2005, nationalist representation reached a 
low of only 41%. While this corresponded with a decrease in ETA attacks due to ceasefire talks, 
generally, nationalist representation does not correspond with ETA actions. Representation for 
Basque nationalist parties in the Basque Parliament has typically remained above 50%.  
 
Graph 2.2: Basque Parliament: Number of Seats Held 
  1980 1984 1986 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2009 2012 2016 
Nationalist Parties          
 PNV/ 
EA 
      33 29    
 PNV 25 32 17 22 22 21   30 27 28 
 EH 
Bildu 
         21 18 
 HB 11 11 13 13 11       
 EH      14 7     
 EE 6 6 9 6        
 Aralar        1 4   
 EA   13 9 8 6   1   
Non- Nationalist Parties          
 PSE-
PSOE 
9 19 19 16        
 PSEEE/ 
PSOE 
    12 14 13 18 25 16 9 
 PP    6 11 16 19 15 13 10 9 
Other  9 7 4 3 11 4 3 12 2 1 11 
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Graph 2.2 shows the composition of the Basque Parliament by political party and how it 
has changed over time. Due to the amount of political parties and the frequency of renaming and 
dissolution, only the major Basque nationalist and nationwide parties are included in the table. 
The other category encompasses the seats that political parties not included in the chart held each 
year. Although parties have appeared and disappeared throughout the years, PNV has remained a 
constant presence in the Basque Parliament, steadily maintaining the largest number of seats. As 
a centrist party, PNV ensures that more radical nationalists, who support the use of violence, do 
not control País Vasco.  
Another notable portion of this chart is the popularity of Herri Batasuna (HB). HB and its 
subsequent party, EH, steadily received the second highest number of seats in Parliament when 
looking at the nationalist parties. As the political wing of ETA, this stands in sharp contrast to 
PNV, which condemns the use of violence. This implies that a significant segment of the Basque 
population supported ETA’s violent tactics to achieve their goals, as representatives of the group 
steadily composed about 15% of Parliament. Until the groups were banned from politics, they 
fought to further the interests of ETA politically, while ETA continued its violent attacks.  
However, the popular nationwide party PSOE maintained higher representation in 
Parliament than all nationalist parties, with the exception of PNV. Although, in 1986, PSOE 
gained control of Parliament for the first and only time, with 19 seats as opposed to the 17 seats 
held by PNV. During 1987-1990, the Basque Parliament president was from PSE-PSOE. This is 
significant because during the reign of PSOE, nationalist parties received roughly 67% of the 
overall vote. Although ETA was active at this point, in the 1986-1990 period, ETA only 
maintained an average of 32 victims per year, down from its most violent period of 1978-1982 
where they achieved an average of 60 victims per year (Ministerio del Interior). Despite the 
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decrease in ETA attacks, HB representation remained constant while PNV representation fell to 
PSE-PSOE.  
The reign of PNV was only interrupted by PSOE from 1987-1990 until 2009-2012, when 
a PP candidate became president. These are the only two periods in the history of the Basque 
Parliament that a party other than PNV held power. However, in 2009 when PP won control, the 
nationalist parties combined only won 48% of the vote. This was also during a period of low 
attacks from ETA, with only three victims in 2009 and one the following year (Ministerio del 
Interior).  
 
Graph 2.3: Nationalist Representation in Basque Parliament vs ETA victims  
 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, nationalist representation in Parliament does align with periods of high ETA 
violence. However, once HB and EH were banned as political parties in 2003, the number of 
ETA victims almost disappears, with only 15 victims from 2003-2010. This represents the lowest 
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period of ETA activity since their formation, when they only had 4 victims between 1968-1972 
(Ministerio del Interior). However, this period was before the transition to democracy, so it was 
not considered in this analysis.  
While I hypothesized that increased nationalist representation in the Basque Parliament 
would lead to decreased violence, this turned out to be incorrect. There could be various 
explanations for the lack of correlation between nationalist representation and violence. Not all 
nationalist parties promote violence by ETA, or any group, to reach their goals. PNV is a prime 
example of this. As the controlling and largest party in País Vasco, PNV does not support the use 
of violence and would not help ETA to achieve their goals. It is plausible that ETA may have cut 
back on its violent attacks if it believed that it would be able to accomplish its goals politically. 
However, since most nationalist parties did not represent their specific interests, and the ones that 
did, namely HB, only controlled about 15% of Parliament, it makes sense that violence did not 
decrease as nationalist representation in Parliament increased. In fact, nationalist representation 
was highest while ETA was still very active.   
The amount of nationalist representation during ceasefire negotiations is intriguing. 
During efforts to reach a 2006 ceasefire, nationalist parties only received 41% of the vote, while 
when the 2011 ceasefire was achieved, nationalists received 59% of the vote in 2012 
(Departamento de Seguridad). It is possible that representation for the nationalist parties 
decreased immediately before the 2006 ceasefire, as the populace did not believe it was likely 
that ceasefire negotiations would be successful with the PSOE government, as they had been 
with the PP government. However, nationalist representation may have risen in the aftermath of 
the 2011 ceasefire, as a peaceful solution had been reached, and ETA and their violence was no 
longer an issue that nationalist parties had to defend or revoke during elections.  
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Over time, there appears to have been little if any correlation between nationalist 
representation and ETA violence. Nationalist representation has remained relatively constant in 
the Basque Parliament despite highs and lows in ETA victims.  
While looking at the data is important, it is also vital to examine the ideological positions 
of each party. As a rightist party, PP continues to be the political party most associated with the 
Franco regime, while PSOE, a social democrat party, represents a continuation of the Second 
Republic. Within this context, the Basque nationalist parties have fallen into an awkward 
position as to whether or not they were going to cooperate with a democratic, Spanish 
government. While the majority took the seats that they won in the Cortes, some parties, such as 
Herri Batasuna (HB) and its subsequent rebirths, would not take their seats, as an allegiance to 
the Spanish Constitution had to be pledged. As a centrist party, PNV was willing to cooperate 
with the Spanish governments, especially PP, as it was also a centrist-right party. However, as 
evidenced by the actions of HB, the position that the abertzale left held was more precarious. 
While the abertzale left was frequently more willing to work with the PSOE government, due to 
their leftist ideology, this did not always function well. Nevertheless, it was during Zapatero’s 
PSOE government that a ceasefire between ETA and the Spanish state was closest to being 
reached. Similarities in ideology lent the PNV to supporting PP and the abertzale left to 
supporting PSOE, while the ruling parties’ relations with ETA have prompted change in power, 
as evidenced by the GAL situation and 11-M attacks.  
Currently in País Vasco, nationalist parties do not face the same support that they enjoyed 
in the 1980s. However, nationalist representation has continued to increase since 2005. This may 
be a result of diminished ETA activity. As the group is now in a permanent ceasefire, Basques 
can profess a more nationalist sentiment without fear of being grouped with the ETA terrorists.  
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As such, I believe that nationalist parties in Basque Parliament will continue to hold a minimum 
of half the seats, but likely more.  Additionally, the pacifist position among the abertzale left will 
continue to grow, as the main supporters of violence have been illegalized and using violence to 
meet goals is no longer a trend since ETA’s ceasefire. While the centrist PNV is likely to remain 
in the majority, the abertzale left will continue to have a presence in the Basque Parliament.  
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Ch. 3: Public Opinion of ETA 
 
 Maintaining public support is vital to both terrorist groups and the governments that 
combat them. If either group has public support on its side, it is able to justify its actions as the 
will of the people. Public support for ETA has risen and fallen over time, reaching a high point 
after the assassination of General Franco’s chosen successor, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. 
However, public opinion towards ETA later fell, as it was attacking a young democratic state.  
 Within this section, I will use the EuskoBarómetro, a study on Basque public opinion, to 
examine opinions related to ETA and their use of violence. Conducted by the University of País 
Vasco, the EuskoBarómetro surveys Vizcaya, the Basque region of Spain, while leaving out 
Navarre and the Basque region of France. However, as Navarre is its own autonomous 
community, these limitations will not be detrimental to conclusions drawn from this data. The 
EuskoBarómetro survey began in 1999 and is conducted twice a year, except for 2015, when it 
was only conducted once. While this does not measure public opinion during the peak years of 
ETA, it is possible to see public opinions from the time when ETA began negotiating its first 
unsuccessful ceasefire.  
 Within this chapter, I examine various EuskoBarómetro surveys to evaluate public 
opinion towards ETA, violence, the possibility of a ceasefire, and the possibility of independence 
for Vizcaya. I examine the data from 1999-2016 to see how trends changed over time. The year 
1999 marks the year in which ETA attacks was at its lowest point since the formation of the 
group and provides a baseline on opinion of ETA, violence, and ceasefire negotiations. 
Furthermore, I examine current surveys to see how Basque opinions towards violence and 
independence have changed since ETA’s ceasefire and disarmament.  
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Nationalist Sentiment of The Basques  
 This section discusses how the Basques define themselves, their opinion regarding 
nationalist sentiment, as well as their desire for independence. I focus on averages based on the 
18 years included in the EuskoBarómetro and use specific years only as reference points of 
noticeable highs and lows, as the overall sentiment does not vary considerably between years.  
 
Graph 3. 1: National Identity of Basques (1999-2016) 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Only Basque 30.56 2.7 25 35 
More Basque Than Spanish 21.3 1.89 18 25 
Equally Basque and Spanish 34.5 1.98 31 38 
More Spanish than Basque 4.3 1.45 2 7 
Only Spanish 5.3 1.45 3 8 
No Answer 3.9 1.54 2 8 
 
 In each EuskoBarómetro Survey, the Basque participants were asked which national 
identity they identified with the most. Instead of being asked to choose between Basque and 
Spanish, this survey allowed for nuanced categories, which is out of the norm. As expected, a 
large portion of the surveyed population identified as either completely Basque (31%) or more 
Basque than Spanish (21%). However, the importance of a duality as both Basque and Spanish 
represents the largest percentage of the population (35%). When added to the people who self-
identify as primarily or completely Basque (52%), the percentage of people who identify as 
Basque climbs to 87% of the population. This stands in sharp contrast to the 9% of the 
population that identify as primarily Spanish. In fact, even when Spanish sentiment was at its 
highest (2000), only 14% of Basques identified as completely or mostly Spanish. Thus, from this 
graph, it is obvious that most Basques feel a special connection with their Basque roots and feel 
their Basqueness is important to note. However, regional identity throughout Spain is very 
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strong, so this is not necessarily a unique aspect. As this is true, it would seem plausible to 
assume that nationalist sentiment among Basques would also run high; however, this is not the 
case.  
 Although the majority of inhabitants of Euskadi identify as Basque, nationalist sentiment 
is not high. In fact, on average, only 43% of Basques self-identify as possessing nationalist 
sentiment, with 51% reporting none, while 6% abstained from answering. Within this context, 
nationalist sentiment was not necessarily defined as pro violence; rather, the majority of those 
who said they were nationalist were affiliated with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) with a 
smaller proportion reporting association with EH Bildu (EHB). Nationalist sentiment among 
Basques reached its peak in 1999, 2013, 2015, and 2016 with 46% of Basques representing 
nationalist views.2 Within these dates, 1999 is the only year in which ETA was active and 
nationalist sentiment was high. This could mean that nationalism could not flourish while ETA 
was active; however, this does not hold. While nationalism increased during the 2006 ceasefire 
(to 43% as opposed to 40% the previous year), and the 2011 ceasefire (to 45%, up from 39% in 
2010), nationalist sentiment increased in other years when a ceasefire was not in effect. This is 
noticeable in 2001 (to 45% from 42%) and 2009 (from 39% to 44%), when ceasefires were not 
in effect, so ETA activity did not decrease. While an increase in nationalist sentiment in times of 
high ETA activity would seem plausible, as ETA embraced their Basque heritage and fought for 
independence for País Vasco, this was not the case. Conversely, periods of ETA inactivity are 
correlated with an increase in nationalist sentiment. However, ETA inactivity is not the only 
cause for increased nationalist sentiment, as evidenced by periods where nationalist sentiment 
increased but ETA activity did not decrease.  
                                                      
2 As the survey did not explicitly define what it meant by “nationalistic” sentiment, I assume that they use the 
standard definition of advocating political independence for País Vasco. 
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Graph 3.2: Average Desire for Independence (1999-2016) 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Large 33.06 3.19 29 40 
Small 26.1 4.08 20 33 
None 27.61 5.21 17 37 
Indifferent 7.89 2.98 2 14 
No Answer 5.33 2.54 1 12 
 
 Although less than half of the Basque population held nationalist sentiments, those who 
possessed a desire for independence were greater. Of those surveyed, 33% had a great desire for 
Basque independence, while an additional 26% had small desires for independence, making 59% 
of Basques holding a degree of desire for independence. In contrast, only 28% of Basques have 
no desire for independence. Desire for independence was highest in 1999, when 73% of Basques 
had had some desire for independence- 40% large and 33% small. Consequently, this was also 
the year in which desire to remain a part of Spain was the smallest at only 17%. Other than 1999, 
the wish to separate from Spain was highest in 2005 and 2006 at 68% and 62% respectively. 
Interestingly, this was the period of an ETA ceasefire. However, after the permanent ETA 
ceasefire of 2011, the desire for a Basque state did not rise, remaining at an average of only 54% 
from 2011 to the present. It can therefore be concluded that ETA actions did not influence the 
Basques desire for statehood, as the 2005-2006 ceasefire resulted in increased demand for 
independence while the permanent 2011 lessened this demand.   
However, while many people desired independence, a much smaller percentage actually 
believed that independence was possible to achieve. Only four percent of Basques thought that 
independence was certain while 27% thought that there was a high probability of Vizcaya 
gaining independence; however, 45% thought there was a slight possibility. While this figure 
was only available in the 1999 EuskoBarómetro, it is not possible to determine how it changed 
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over time, especially in the periods where the push for independence was greatest. As such, 
while Basques were in favor of independence, they realized that chances of actually achieving 
independence were small and unlikely to occur.  
 
Basque Preoccupations and Opinions on Violence  
 As an autonomous region, the principal problems of Euskadi were not always the same as 
the rest of Spain. This section examines the preoccupations of the Basque populace as well as 
their opinion on the problem of violence.  
 
Graph 3.3: Principal Preoccupations of the Basques (1999-2016) 
 
 This survey had the most changes in answer choices from year to year; in order to 
account for these changes, I have grouped the various options into four main categories: 
economic situation, violence/drugs, social welfare, and the political situation3.   
                                                      
3 Economic situation includes unemployment and overall economic health. Social welfare includes living, 
health, education, inequality, and overall welfare. Political situation includes data on immigration, peace 
attempts, and the overall political situation.  
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 
Preocupations of Basques
Economic Situation Violence/Drugs
Social Welfare Political Situation
Kern 36 
 It is noteworthy to point out that violence has never been the main preoccupation of the 
Basques. The economic situation, mainly unemployment, has always held the top spot, 
throughout 1999-2016. While violence was consistently second, in the periods of 2005-2007 and 
2009-2013, inequality and welfare were considered more worrisome. Within these time periods, 
ETA activity was low due to the 2006 and 2011 ceasefires.  
 
Graph 3.4: ETA Victims and Basque Preoccupation with Violence (1999-2013)4 
 
 Graph 4 shows the relationship between the number of ETA victims and the Basque 
preoccupation with violence. While Graph 3 showed the average percentage of Basques listing 
violence as a worry, Graph 4 shows the breakdown by year. From this graph, it is evident that 
Basque preoccupation with violence rose and fell in comparison to ETA victims. The 2005 
ceasefire has zero ETA victims and only 35% of Basques listed violence as a concern. This 
represents a low point in concern for violence that is not reached again until 2008. From this 
                                                      
4 The first data point for ETA victims is part of a larger trend of high numbers of ETA victims. It was during 
the period shown that ETA victims were in decline. I began the graph in 1999 as that was when the 
EuskoBarómetro data was first available.  
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point, violence continues to diminish as a primary concern. By the time of the 2011 ceasefire, 
only eight percent of Basques listed violence as a concern, and further dropped to only two 
percent in the following years.  
 This same trend is evidenced when the EuskoBarómetro survey asked respondents if they 
believed the issue of violence had improved or worsened from the previous years. 
 
Graph 3.5: The Evolution of the Problem of Violence from the Previous Year (1999-2010) 
 
 
The evolution of violence in a large way depended on the actions of ETA. As the number of 
victims of ETA fell, respondents believed that the problem of violence was lessening. This is 
specifically evidenced from 2001 to 2005, when an ETA ceasefire was called. However, when 
the ceasefire was called off, this corresponded with the populace believing that the problem of 
violence was more severe. Nevertheless, people never believed that the problem was worse than 
in 2000, when the number of ETA victims was the highest within this selection of data at 23. 
This is a limited conclusion, as data from earlier periods, where ETA was more active, is not 
available. It is plausible to assume that Basques would have considered violence to have 
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continually worsened through ETA’s peak in the 1980’s. This graph represents the period of 
ETA’s decline where they were no longer as imminent of a threat as they had previously been.  
 
Opinion of ETA  
Within this section, I present how the Basque people viewed both ETA and ETA 
operatives. The portion of the EuskoBarómetro that deals with views on operatives was only 
conducted in 1999; however, it includes references to 1996, so it is possible to show how opinion 
changed over time. Nevertheless, this data is limited, as it only represents the opinions of 
Basques regarding ETA in a time when ETA was already in decline.  
 
Graph 3.6: Basque Attitudes Toward ETA (1999-2016) 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Total Rejection 58.5 6.77 35 66 
Fear 3.83 1.07 2 6 
Indifference 4.39 2.16 1 8 
Support but now rejection 14.89 3.6 7 20 
Support ends, not means 11.5 1.77 7 15 
Critical justification 3.06 1.87 1 9 
Total support 0.94 0.7 0 3 
No answer 2.89 1.63 0 7 
 
Overall, the Basque reaction towards ETA is one of complete rejection (58.5%). After 
this significant portion of the population, it is important to note that additional 15% of the 
population that formerly supported ETA now rejects the group, while 12% support the goals of 
ETA but not the means to which they went to achieve them. Only one percent of the population 
of Euskadi totally supported ETA in 1999. However, it is interesting that only four percent of 
Basques admitted to fearing ETA. While the averages help to present a tidy image of Basque 
public opinion, it is important to look at the various years to see trends.  
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Basque attitudes towards ETA in 1999 represented a high of support between 1999-2016; 
however, a decline in overall opinion towards ETA is evident. Only two percent of Basques 
totally supported ETA, and although this is the highest amount of support for ETA in the given 
range, except for 2002, it is likely that support for ETA was higher previously. Twenty percent 
of Basques who formerly supported ETA now does not accept the group, while 15% support the 
goals of ETA but not the methods used to achieve them. Both represent the highest level of 
support for ETA between 1999 to 2016. However, what is most telling of 1999 is that only 35% 
of Basques completely rejected the group. This is the lowest level of rejection that the 
EuskoBarómetro reports. Nevertheless, while 1999 represented the highest amount of support for 
ETA, it is also the year in which the highest percentage of Basques (6%) reporting fearing the 
group. Thus, while ETA was most popular in 1999, its high level of fear corresponds with the 
high in the victim count between 1999-2016. While it is not surprising that the group was most 
feared when it had the most attacks, it is interesting that support for the group was also highest 
then, during the high point of attacks.  
The two ETA ceasefires, in 2006 and 2011, represent another interesting time. In 2006, 
only half of Basques totally rejected ETA, the lowest since 1999. While total support remained 
constant (1%), 14% supported the ends but not the means of ETA and 19% of former supporters 
now rejected the group. The numbers in 2011 are similar to those in 2006, with the exception of 
the percentage of Basques who rejected ETA completely (60%) and the former advocates of 
ETA (13%). Only 12% supported the ends of the group; however, in both years only four percent 
of Basques reported feared the group. This low amount of fear is likely due to the ceasefire 
negotiations and tentative peace which occurred in both 2006 and 2011.  
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In regards to the Basques opinions surrounding ETA, it would be more beneficial to have 
data from the years of ETA’s main activities to see how reactions varied during periods of high 
activity and relative quiet. In the EuskoBarómetro data set, the only year of relative activity for 
ETA is in 1999. The rest of the data provides data on periods of low activity and peace. 
However, it can be concluded that fear of ETA was highest when the group was most active and 
remained relatively steady the rest of the time. Additionally, while ETA was moderately active 
(in 1999) it received the least amount of total rejection, although other forms of rejection were 
higher (former supporters and those who support the ends, not the means).  
 
Graph 3.7: Image of ETA Operatives in Euskadi  
 
Although support for ETA decreased, the Basque populace also began to see it in a new, 
better light. Between 1996 and 1999, the public came to see ETA as patriots and idealists instead 
of terrorists and assassins. Graph 7 shows that the image of ETA activists as idealists more than 
doubled, from 16% in 1996 to 36% in 1999. As the positive image grew, the negative shrank. In 
1996, 32% of Basques saw ETA as terrorists and 21% saw the group as assassins. This stands in 
remarkable contrast to the figures from 1999 that show that 23% saw the group as terrorists, 
while only 8% saw them as assassins. Thus, while support for ETA and their actions declined, 
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their overall image transformed from one of terrorism and violence to one of patriotism and 
freedom-fighters. It is unknown how ceasefire attempts affected its image throughout Euskadi, as 
data on how ETA was viewed was only available in the 1999 EuskoBarómetro. However, it is 
likely that the image of operatives as terrorists continued to decline, as large scale terror 
activities were discontinued. The possible exception to this is in 2006 when the group attacked 
the Madrid Barajas Airport in the midst of negotiations, effectively ending the 2006 peace.  
 
Opinion on an ETA Ceasefire 
 This portion of the paper focuses on people’s opinion towards an eventual negotiation 
between the Spanish state and ETA. Despite ETA’s successful attempt at negotiating a ceasefire, 
it is not recognized by the Spanish state, which still considers ETA an active terrorist group. The 
ceasefire was brokered by international actors, who continue to hold ETA to the agreed upon 
standards. Nevertheless, I examine Basque public opinion toward a government recognized 
ceasefire, as well as opinion towards the continued use of violence to reach political ideals.  
 
Graph 3.8: Opinion on an Eventual ETA-Government Ceasefire Negotiation (1999-2015) 
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In regards to attempts at negotiating with ETA to reach a ceasefire, Basques were 
overwhelmingly in favor and expected ceasefire negotiations to begin between ETA and the 
Spanish government in 1999. Sixty-two percent of Basques believed that negotiations would 
begin without any conditions being met. However, 29% admitted that negotiations would not 
commence until ETA laid down their arms. Only five percent of Basques did not expect 
negotiations to occur in 1999. While peace talks did begin in 1999 between ETA and the 
government, there would need to be conditions. Ceasefires only lasted a month or two at the 
beginning, as ETA was unwilling to compromise on its core demands, leading negotiations to be 
unsuccessful.  
Basque sentiment towards negotiations continued to be positive, with only an average of 
14% of Basques believing that negotiations would not occur under any circumstance. While for 
those in favor of eventual negotiations, more believed that negotiations would only occur if ETA 
disarmed (42%) in contrast to those who thought talks would begin without conditions (39%).  
Those who believed that the government would only negotiate if ETA disarmed were 
highest a year before ceasefires were called, 49% in 2005 and 50% in 2010. Additionally, in 
these years, 33% of Basques believed that negotiations would occur without conditions, with 
only 12-13% believing that negotiations would not occur.  
In looking at the actual years of the ceasefires, 2006 and 2011, there is great difference in 
how Basques perceived negotiations. In 2006, those who believed that negotiations would not 
occur was only 8%, the lowest except for 1999. This is likely due the fact that negotiations 
between ETA and the government were already in session, and it was assumed they would 
continue. In contrast, in 2011, 18% thought that negotiations would not occur, likely a result of 
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the government’s stance on not negotiating with ETA and negotiations with international actors 
that were ongoing.  
Opinion regarding ETA-government peace talks has always been overwhelmingly in 
support of peace, regardless of the level of violence. However, when violence was more 
prevalent (1999), more Basques believed that they would only occur if ETA disarmed.  
It is important to note that an average of 13% of Basques did not believe negotiations 
would occur in any case. While it may be assumed that this percentage of the population were 
diehard ETA supporters, that is not the case. Nationalists made up part of this number, however, 
members of the Partido Popular (PP) composed the majority.  
 Despite the fact that a negotiation between the Spanish state and ETA has not occurred, 
the ceasefire holds. As such, from 2011 on, EuskoBarómetro survey participants were asked if 
they believed that it was possible to defend all political ideas without the need for reoccurring 
violence. The answer to this question was a resounding yes. An average of 83% of Basques 
agreed that this was likely in the coming years. Only seven percent disagreed while a further 
seven percent remained neutral.   
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter has covered public opinion of the Basques regarding a variety of topics, 
including nationalist sentiment, opinions on violence, views on ETA, and thoughts on ceasefire 
negotiations. While some analysis was possible, the conclusions are limited as data was not 
available for the peak years of ETA activity. As such, the comparisons made only apply to the 
periods of relative peace in Euskadi, with 1999 representing the only year where violence was at 
a moderate level.  
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 ETA activity did not influence how Basques regarded their identity, nationalist sentiment, 
or desire for independence. Most Basques identify themselves as either completely Basque or 
more Basque than Spanish. However, while 52% characterize themselves as Basque, only 43% 
of Basques admit to feeling a nationalist sentiment. While most Basques expressed desire for an 
independent Basque state, this was not influenced by ETA actions. This is evidenced by the 
ceasefire attempts; while 2006 resulted in an increased demand for independence, the 2011 peace 
led to a decrease. Despite a desire for independence, Basques were more realistic about the 
ability to actually achieve independence. Only roughly a third of Basques believed that Basque 
independence was certain or highly probable. ETA actions proved to be uncorrelated with how 
the Basques identified themselves, expressed nationalist sentiment, or influenced independence 
demands.  
 Basque opinions on violence were slightly more correlated to ETA actions, even though 
violence was never the principal concern of Basques. The evolution of violence depended on 
ETA actions and was correlated to Basque worry. As ETA violence decreased, the preoccupation 
with violence decreased; however, due to the unreliability of ETA ceasefires, a degree of worry 
always remained until the present, now that the 2011 ceasefire has been held and attacks stopped. 
Thus, ETA attacks and the Basques perception of violence are correlated, as expected.  
 Public opinion on ETA was vastly negative in the studied period. A majority of the 
population (60%) rejected the group while only 1% supported ETA. The portion of the Basque 
population that regarded ETA with fear corresponded with ETA violence. In the years in which 
ETA was more active, a greater percentage reported fear toward ETA, while peaceful periods 
resulted in fewer fearful individuals. However, other than this category, the other perceptions of 
ETA did not correlate with ETA actions.   
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 Finally, the Basque public was overwhelmingly in support of negotiations between ETA 
and the Spanish government; however, the conditions needed to negotiate were debatable. 
Opinions regarding ceasefires were not correlated with ETA activity, except for 2006, when 
ETA and the government were in the middle of negotiations. As the final 2011 ceasefire was not 
brokered with the Spanish state, this did not affect results regarding a government negotiation, 
which Basques are still in favor of. However, in light of the 2011 ceasefire, Basques began to be 
asked if they believed it was possible to defend political ideas without the use of violence. 
Basques responded with a vehement yes, clearly showing their opposition to ETA tactics.  
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Ch. 4: Economy of País Vasco 
 
 País Vasco is typically considered one of the more affluent regions of Spain, along with 
Catalonia. In 2014, the most recent year on record, the GDP per capita (PPP) of Euskal Herria 
was €31,600 (this number includes all seven Basque territories); this exceeded Spain, at €25,000, 
and the European Union rate of €27,500 (“Economy”). The Basque economy first gained 
prominence through its industrial capacity, but it later changed to a service based economy, 
which remains today. Currently, services make up 58.8% of GDP; industry is responsible for 
24.66% (21.14% manufacturing, 7.03% construction, 0.65% agriculture and fisheries (“Basque 
Country”). Through the evolution of the economy, Basque society also changed, through early 
industrialization and immigration.  
 Basques have a strong history of industry, which dominated its economy until the recent 
shift to a service based economy. An abundance of iron ore was present in Euskadi and, while 
used in Euskadi, was also transported to Britain for industrial processing; this fueled the 
economy and the development of industry at home. Mining, steel, and shipbuilding industries 
came to dominate Euskadi, especially Bilbao. The developing economy required a large work 
force, drawing immigrants from around Spain and other countries, notably from France. This 
influx of foreigners led to an expansion of cultural difference and languages. Immigration to 
Euskadi to fuel industrialization continued throughout Franco’s regime. It was not until recently 
that Euskadi moved away from industrialization.  
In the 1980s, Bilbao officials began to see tourism as a solution for the declining 
industrial market. While travel to the industrialized center for business was common, there was a 
shift towards appealing to leisure tourism. In an effort to appeal to leisure travels, the city began 
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development of new transportation systems, notably a metro system and airport, parks, apartment 
complexes, and stores. The Guggenheim Museum is considered the crowning jewel of this 
period of revamping (Plaza 2000, 267). The region, already transitioning to a service based 
economy, increased the number of hotels, restaurants, bars, and shops to accommodate the 
growing number of tourists that the Guggenheim attracted. From the opening of the museum in 
1997, attendance was higher than anticipated. In the first year alone, a million visitors patronized 
the museum, a figure which the Guggenheim has maintained since; this allowed for the museum 
to pay for itself within five years (Franklin 2016, 80). By embracing tourism as a growing outlet 
for economic growth, Euskadi was able to revitalize their economy, largely due the success of 
the Guggenheim museum.  
 As an autonomous community, País Vasco has more control of its finances, as it retains 
control of its tax system. Instead of the Spanish state levying taxes, the process of levying taxes 
is held by Basque regional tax authorities. As such, Basques have the power to levy various 
taxes, including direct income tax, company tax, wealth taxes, inheritance taxes, gift tax (Ruiz 
Almendral 2008, 58). Furthermore, Basques are in charge of indirect taxes such as VAT, 
property transfer taxes, special taxes, and regulate local taxes. While the Basque authorities are 
responsible for levying taxes, País Vasco still pays taxes to the Spanish state, as it provides 
services such as defense, the armed forces, international relations, customs and tariff agreements, 
and other similar services (Ruiz Almendral 2008, 59). Through a complicated system, the 
amount of taxes that País Vasco pays to the state is determined; however, this amount is 
generally small, less than one percent of total taxes collected in Euskadi (Ruiz Almendral 2008, 
47). The computation method for determining taxes owed to the state is controversial, as 
opponents feel it favors the Basque regional government (Ruiz Almendral 2008, 49).  
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 Within this chapter, I explore the economy of País Vasco. My primary standard for this 
measurement will be GDP per capita (PPP). I will compare the GDP per capita (PPP) of País 
Vasco with that of Spain to determine if economic trends within Spain in general impacted that 
of País Vasco. Next, I will compare the GDP per capita of each region to the number of ETA 
victims to look for a relationship. Then, I look at the Basque peoples’ view of the economy, both 
within País Vasco and Spain as a whole. By doing this, I seek to determine if there is a 
relationship between ETA violence and economic conditions. I hypothesize that the economy 
lagged when ETA was most active, as well as if the people’s perception of the economy matched 
with how it actually performed.  
 
País Vasco Economic Performance  
 Within this section, I discuss the actual performance of the economy of País Vasco, 
measured in GDP per capita (PPP) in euros. I compare País Vasco with Spain and the European 
Union, and, later, with the record of ETA incidents.  
 
Graph 4.1: Comparison of GDP per capita (PPP): Euskadi and Spain (1990-2015) 
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Graph 4.2: GDP Growth Per Year: Euskadi and Spain (1980-2015) 
 
 
 For Euskadi and Spain, the net GDP per capita (PPP) steadily increases from 1990-2016, 
with the exception of the 2008 economic crisis. Examining the recovery from the 2008 crisis in 
interesting, as it shows that País Vasco’s economy bounced back from the crisis quicker than that 
of Spain. While both regions experienced a decline, Spain’s decline began in 2008 and lasted 
through 2013, with 2014 showing the first net increase. Meanwhile, Euskadi’s economy declined 
in 2009, showed a short recovery, and an additional drop from 2012-2013. Nevertheless, 
Euskadi’s initial decline in 2009 (-5.4) was greater than that of Spain (-4.4). However, the 
reverse is true in 2012, when Spain’s decline of -2.7 exceeded that of Euskadi’s -2.0. While this 
supports that the 2008 economic crisis did not affect Euskadi as much as Spain or the EU, this 
could be because Euskadi’s economy is based in services and industry. As such, it was not as 
affected by the burst of the housing bubble as regions with a strong basis in construction or as 
affected as regions that depended on tourism, which was also greatly affected. This allowed the 
economy to recover quicker than that of Spain as a whole.  
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Graph 4.3: Number of ETA victims and GDP per capita in Euskadi (1980-2015) 
  
 
Graph 4.4: Correlation Between ETA victims and GDP per capita (1980-2012) 
 
 
From 1996 onwards, Euskadi surpassed Spain in terms of GDP per capita (PPP). Even in 
periods of economic decline, País Vasco maintained a higher economic status than Spain. ETA 
violence does not appear to affect the Basque region, as it remained affluent, despite attacks. In 
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fact, Euskadi faced some of its largest growth during high periods of ETA violence. The highest 
growth rate of 14.1% was in 1988 when there were 21 victims attributed to ETA. Throughout the 
1980s, when ETA violence was at its peak, País Vasco had its highest amounts of economic 
growth. Growth continued throughout ceasefires, although at a slower rate: 8.3% in 1999, 7% in 
2005-2006, and 0.4% in 2011.  
While this suggests that ETA violence and GDP per capita are not related, Graph 4.4 
shows and inverse relationship between the two variables. Pearson’s R shows a value of 0.76, 
showing that there is a relatively strong relationship between the two variables.  Furthermore, the 
trend line, produced by a logarithmic function, provides an R squared value of .6767, meaning 
that approximately 68% of the number of deaths by ETA can be explained by looking at the 
GDP per capita of Euskadi.  This shows a strong relationship between the two variables.   
 
Opinion of Economy 
 In the EuskoBarómetro surveys from 1999-2016, participants were asked to evaluate the 
economic climate in both País Vasco and the whole of Spain. Respondents were given four 
choices: good, regular, bad, and no answer. This section examines the responses regarding País 
Vasco and compare them to the answers regarding Spain. As ETA activity was relatively low in 
this period, it is not correlated to the number of ETA victims; however, the times of the 
ceasefires are discussed.  
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Graph 4.5: Opinion of the Basque Economic Situation 
  
 Until immediately before the 2008 economic crisis, most Basques believed that the 
economic situation they occupied in País Vasco was good. Beginning in 2007, however, the 
number of Basques who believed their economic situation dropped and stayed low until recently. 
While those who believed the economic situation to be normal remained relatively constant, the 
classifications of good and bad are inversely related. In 2012-2013, the most people classified the 
economy as bad, contrasting with the low of the good category. This matches the period when 
the GDP per capita (PPP) of Euskadi was at its lowest in recent times, 30,627 and 30,289 
respectively. As such, it is clear that perception of the economic situation in País Vasco matched 
actual occurrences.  
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Graph 4.6: Comparison of Economic opinion of Euskadi and Spain (1999-2016) 
 
 
While the Basques were able to correctly judge their economic situation, they always 
viewed the situation in País Vasco to be better than that of Spain as a whole. The opinions 
regarding the economic situation in País Vasco and Spain have the same highs and lows, but to a 
different extent. Bad economic times in País Vasco were always slightly better than the bad 
times for Spain, while the good times where better in País Vasco than for Spain. For example, in 
2012, the year where economic opinion was lowest, in País Vasco 66% of respondents thought 
that the economic situation was poor, in contrast to 94% saying Spain’s situation was bad. As 
ETA’s ceasefire was already in effect by this time, the economic downturn was in no way 
correlated with ETA violence.  Similarly, the best economic time in País Vasco does not 
correspond in any way with violence. In 2001, 52% of Basques thought that the economic 
situation was good; however, in this year, there were 15 victims of ETA attacks.  
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Conclusions 
 The economic situation in País Vasco is one of the best in Spain, surpassing the GDP per 
capita (PPP) of Spain in every year beginning with 1996. Additionally, due to the fact that the 
Basque economy is not dependent on construction, the 2008 economic crisis did not affect País 
Vasco as much as the rest of Spain and they were able to recover quicker. People’s perceptions 
of the economic situation more or less mirrored the actual progression of the economy for both 
País Vasco and Spain; however, Basques consistently viewed their own situation as better than 
that of Spain, even if the actual data does not fully support their perceptions.  
I expected to find an increase in violence during times of economic hardship, and this 
was found to be true. Within the studies’ time period, there was a correlation between the GDP 
per capita (PPP) and violence contributed to ETA, higher GDP per capita led to lower violence. 
However, the Basques were not a poor people revolting against their wealthy oppressors, 
suggesting that their violence was not expressly related to economic conditions.  
Despite this correlation, the economy was not explicitly tied to violence. While ETA 
targeted businessmen to hold for ransom, violent actions were not the deciding factor as to 
whether the economy would be good or bad. The largest impact on the economy was from the 
burst of the housing bubble that resulted in the economic crisis of 2008. Thus, while decreased 
violence was linked to increased economic conditions, factors outside the realm of violence 
impacted the economy in a more direct fashion.   
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Ch. 5: Conclusion 
 
My thesis examined whether political, public opinion, or economic factors were related to 
increases or decreases in ETA violence. Through my research, I concluded that neither 
nationalist representation in the Basque Parliament or public opinion correlates with ETA 
attacks; however, the economic situation and violence show a correlation. 
At no point does ETA violence correlate with high periods of nationalist representation. 
The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) has controlled the Basque parliament since 1980, with the 
exception of 1987-1990 and 2009-2012. Even in these periods, nationalist representation 
remained high. This may be because not all nationalist parties represented the interests of ETA, 
or supported violence. Only Herri Batasuna (HB) and Euskal Herritarrok (EH) were closely 
aligned with ETA, and both were both banned in 2003. As pro-ETA parties only controlled 15 
percent of parliament at their peak, ETA likely did not believe that it could achieve its goals 
politically. Because most nationalist parties did not support ETA, it follows that nationalist 
representation and ETA violence would have little to no correlation. ETA’s ceasefire makes it 
now likely that admitting nationalist sentiment is more acceptable, as it is no longer tied to 
violence. Nationalist parties are likely to continue to maintain control of the Basque Parliament, 
especially the moderate, non-violent parties, such as PNV.  
ETA activity during 1999-present also was not influenced by public opinion regarding 
identity, nationalist sentiment, and desire for independence. Although most Basques identified as 
either completely Basque or as more Basque than Spanish, less than half professed a nationalist 
sentiment, regardless of ETA attacks. Similarly, Basque desires for independence were not 
affected by violence, as evidenced by increased desire for independence during 2006 ceasefire 
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negotiations and decreases during the 2011 peace. Basque perceptions of violence were related to 
the actions of ETA: when ETA was more active, the public reported violence as a major 
preoccupation, while in times of peace, the opposite was true. Finally, the public rejected ETA 
while supporting peace negotiations between ETA and the government. The public also 
overwhelmingly supported negotiations, but disagreed on the conditions needed to negotiate. 
There was little correlation between activity and the need to negotiate, with the exception of 
2006, when ETA and the Spanish state were in the midst of ceasefire talks.  
País Vasco surpassed Spain’s GDP per capita (PPP) in every year; the wealth of the 
region showed an inverse relationship with ETA activity. However, as the Basques remained 
relatively wealthy throughout, the economic situation likely was not a large contributor to 
violence. The economy was affected by global events, such as the bursting of the housing 
bubble. While ETA targeted businessmen as subjects for kidnapping, ransom, and, occasionally, 
assassination, these activities did not affect Euskadi’s overall economy.  
After conducting research, I learned that ETA’s violence was not affected by the political 
climate or public opinion of Euskadi, and, while economic conditions were inversely related with 
violence, they are likely not a driving force, as Euskadi remained wealthy. Instead, I propose that 
the cause of ETA’s violence lies outside of structural and institutional factors, or even public 
opinion. Further research is needed to determine what factors, internal or otherwise, led ETA to 
violence and contributed to their eventual ceasefire.   
Failures in leadership and thinning ranks are likely to have had more to do with the 
dissolution of the group, although disappearance of public support and lack of political 
representation may have played a small role. Internal issues are likely to provide further insight 
into the true reasons that ETA violence slowed and the group finally agreed to a ceasefire.  
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This shows that external factors and institutions are not always the cause for ethnic 
violence. Other factors, such as repression of ethnic culture, are likely to lead to the outbreak of 
violence, while internal factors of the group may lead to their continued use of violence.  Similar 
to the Basques, the Kurds are unified by a distinct culture and language.  Although there is a 
semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq, the Kurds do not possess their own state; instead, 
their population is spread throughout five nations: Turkey, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.  
Brutally repressed by their host countries, the Kurdish language, culture, and identity was 
restricted. This led the Kurds to establish the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to advocate for an 
independent state; an armed struggle ensued. After breaking a ceasefire, the struggle between the 
PKK and the Turkish state continues today. The story of the Kurds is eerily similar to that of the 
Basques, showing the same roots of ethnic repression, provoking the outbreak of violence, and 
breaking of ceasefires.  If the lessons regarding ETA’s use of violence are to be applied, it can be 
assumed that the cause of Kurdish violence is not tied to the political condition, public opinion, 
or the economic climate.  While they may play a small role, it is more likely that internal factors 
within the group led to the perpetuance of violence, and will to the group’s eventual end.    
Although my thesis suggests that the political situation, public opinion, and economic 
situation of País Vasco did not correlate with ETA violence, there can be further study conducted 
regarding the reasoning behind continued use of violence and the eventual decline.  I propose 
that internal structures of the group may play a role. Due to similarities regarding the outbreak of 
violence among ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, the causes of violence in ETA may be 
applied to other groups who find themselves in similar situations.   
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